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Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multi-game populations

  • Wenman Chen
  • , Xianjia Wang*
  • , Ji Quan
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Wuhan Univ Technol

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces a multi-game population to describe the fact that people have heterogeneous perceptions on their interactions. Besides, we also consider the diversity of perceptions among all agents in a structured population. Then, we established the theoretical model to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a spatial multi-game population. By means of the Monte Carlo method, we get some insightful observations regarding to the promotion of cooperation. Firstly, simulation results show that agents are more likely to take cooperation action in a multi-game population than in a homogeneous population. Moreover, we also find out that agents playing prisoner's dilemma game are possible to adopt cooperation strategy when they interact with agents playing snowdrift game. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Article number127882
Number of pages5
JournalPhysics Letters, Section A: General, Atomic and Solid State Physics
Volume426
Early online dateDec 2021
DOIs
StatePublished - 28 Feb 2022

Funding

We thank anonymous reviewers for insightful and helpful advice. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72031009) , the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 20&ZD058) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71871171, 71871173) . The numerical calculations in this paper have been done on the supercomputing system in the Supercomputing Center of Wuhan University.

Keywords

  • Multi-game populations
  • Strength dilemma
  • Cooperation
  • Social dilemma games

Indexed by

  • Scopus
  • SCIE
  • EI

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