摘要
The energy harvesting of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has been researched extensively in recent years. However, the existing energy harvesting between the base station and UAVs does not consider the information asymmetry factor, which means the base station provides the radio frequency (RF) energy for UAVs in the context of UAVs' partial private information. In order to maximize the base station's utility or payoff, it is crucial for the base station to motivate more UAVs to harvest RF energy. In the paper, we propose an effective incentive energy harvesting mechanism in UAV communication network, which is a challenging problem since there exist interest conflicts that the base station and UAVs are rational individuals who maximize their utilities. Our objective is to make the base station's utility maximum via balancing the tradeoff between transmit power cost and charged price benefit, while incentivizing UAVs to purchase transmit power. We design a series of optimal energy harvesting contract with different price discounts targeting different types of UAVs by contract theory. Owing to information asymmetry, we analyze two different information scenarios: complete and incomplete information. We suppose the base station knows each UAV's type in complete information, then we analyze the practical case that the base station is aware of incomplete information of UAV's private information. The base station aims to maximize its utility by providing contract. The UAVs choose the contract meeting the individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) rules while maximizing their utilities. Our simulation shows that the energy harvesting mechanism maximizes the base station's utility and stimulates UAVs to purchase RF energy transmit power in different scenarios. Compared with other methods, our proposed optimal contract can improve the utility of the base station while maximizing the utility of UAVs.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页(从-至) | 50-61 |
| 页数 | 12 |
| 期刊 | Computer Communications |
| 卷 | 199 |
| 早期在线日期 | 12月 2022 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 1 2月 2023 |
基金资助
Acknowledgments This research is supported by the NSFC under Grants 61702380, 61772385 and 61972296.
关键词
- Contract theory
- Incentive mechanism
- Energy harvesting
- Individual rationality
- Incentive compatibility
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- SCIE
- EI
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