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Evolutionary games in a generalized Moran process with arbitrary selection strength and mutation

  • Quan Ji*
  • , Wang Xian-Jia
  • *此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件 › 论文 › 同行评审

14 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 x 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals' payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength beta and mutation rate E are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when E is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary beta and epsilon values, the 'Hawk-Dove' game and the 'Coordinate' game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
源语言英语
期刊论文编号030203
页数6
期刊Chinese Physics B
卷20
期3
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 3月 2011

基金资助

Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71071119) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

关键词

  • evolutionary games
  • fitness-dependent Moran process
  • birth-death process
  • evolutionary stable strategy

收录

  • EI
  • Scopus
  • SCIE

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